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ENDS AND MEANS IN LEGAL EDUCATION:
THE FOUNDING OF LIBERTY UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
Bruce W. Greent
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2002, the Liberty University Board of Trustees made the historic
decision to establish a law school. Like Icarus,' a university runs the risk of
seriously overreaching when it undertakes such an educational challenge. It is
no small decision to choose to devote the extraordinary time and resources
necessary to build a sound and principled program of legal education. More
than a few institutions of higher learning, having initially envisioned such a
project with great enthusiasm, eventually found themselves, like the
mythological Icarus, melting down from trying to reach too far. So, it was not
without serious consideration that Liberty University decided to expand its
reach into legal education.
Shortly after the vote by the Liberty Board of Trustees to establish the new
law school, I was invited to become the founding dean. Given the tremendous
outlay of resources necessary, the rigor of the accreditation process, and the
absence of a recognized shortage of lawyers and law schools, 2 I found it
reasonable to inquire whether a legitimate need existed for a new law school. I
was pleased to learn that the desire to start a law school was not a new or
passing consideration for the University. In fact, the decision itself was the
result of a vision by the University's Chancellor, Dr. Jerry Falwell, dating back
over twenty years. The vision of Dr. Falwell was not, however, to establish just
another law school within a region already well represented by schools
providing excellent legal education for their students.3 The vision was to
t Founding Dean of Liberty University School of Law. The following Essay was
compiled from material that originated as oral presentations on the founding and development of
Liberty University School of Law within the first nine months of the law school's planning
phase. Although this essay was organized in written form several years subsequent to that time,
every effort has been made to credit the sources of the many ideas that went into formulating the
law school's educational philosophy and approach.
1. In Greek mythology, Icarus was the son of Daedalus, who with his father escaped from
a tower on the island of Crete, where they were imprisoned by Minos, by making wings of
feathers fastened with wax. Icarus plunged to his death when, reaching for heaven, he flew too
near the Sun and the wax melted.
2. In 2002, there were some 187 ABA-approved law schools in the United States.
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/year.html (ABA historical statistics) (last
visited Nov. 30, 2006).
3. Liberty University is in central Virginia, an area surrounded by well-respected law
schools.
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establish a law school committed to the highest standards of academic and
professional excellence, with a distinctive mission rooted in the Western legal
tradition, which historically maintained that truth, justice, human dignity, and
other such universals have an independent objective existence.
II. THE NEED FOR A DISTINCTIVE APPROACH
We began with the firm belief that legal education occurs in a particular
cultural context, through the lenses of an identifiable metanarrative,4 and with
certain presuppositions or assumptions about reality, law, and legal institutions.
The concern shared by all those involved in the founding of Liberty University
School of Law was that the dominant metanarrative of modem law5 could
benefit from Liberty's distinctive approach.
The common arguments one hears in defense of the nature of law and legal
institutions today derives from moral relativism-from the denial of objective
truth about right and wrong, good and evil.6 Bereft of these transcendent
propositions, the nature of modem law finds its defense in utilitarianism,
instrumentalism, pragmatism, power, and the like-all of which are rooted in
moral relativism. There is no commonly shared sense of a transcendent,
objective truth to guide and direct the practice of law and legal institutions, thus
4. A metanarrative is a "grand theory" or overarching paradigm that gives unity to
historical particulars. See generally IEAN FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A
REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (1984) (maintaining that metanarratives or grand narratives provided the
principle society used to legitimate knowledge through the Enlightenment. He describes
metanarratives as total philosophies of history that regulate decision-making and the
adjudication of truth. He sees the current age of Postmodemism as having brought about an
erosion of confidence in grand metanarratives.).
5. By "modem law," I do not mean law tied to a specific time. Rather, the term "modem
law" refers to the demonstrable and currently common view of law characterized by the pre-
philosophical belief that the universe is ordered by indubitable scientific laws that are indifferent
to man, requiring human beings to assert their own dignity, and the validity of the laws and legal
institutions that preserve it, by a raw assertion of their own autonomy. This view of law is not by
any means universal, but it is common, and as reflected in a growing body of professional
literature, has negatively impacted American legal education. See, e.g., ROBERT GRANFIELD,
MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND (1992); Roger Cramton,
The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978); Arthur A.
Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229; Joseph William Singer, The
Player and the Cards: Nihilism andLegal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). See also MARY ANN
GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is
TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1996); ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1995).
6. This is so even though there is much talk about "human value," "human dignity,"
"justice," and other moral-laden concepts.
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opening the door for easy manipulation of ideas and practices for purposes of
power.
7
In this surreal8 intellectual climate, it is helpful to return to fundamentals-to
first principles-and to rethink the entire justification for law-first by
identifying the essential moral claims of modem law, and then by asking
whether they are defensible on rational and principled grounds.9 Furthermore,
in such a climate, it is advisable for law schools to rethink modem assumptions
and presuppositions regarding the nature of law and to ask whether those
assumptions necessarily support any legitimate obligation to obey the law. If
no objective support can be found, law schools have nothing better to tell their
students than that they ought to obey the law because failure to do so will incur
the raw power of the State.
III. COMMITMENT TO A DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION
In the discussion and foundational stages of the law school formation, we
were united in the desire to make a real and lasting contribution to legal
education. Consistent with this desire, and the mission of the parent university,
we set out to create an academic context in which both students and faculty
could approach law with a deeper level of understanding.
In the context of a Christian law school, the approach to the study of law is
not an attempt to identify a different content of legal subjects so much as it is to
look at the discipline of law through lenses provided by the historic Christian
faith and the Christian intellectual tradition. Humans view life and reality
through their paradigms, metanarratives, and worldviews, and they interpret
data through those lenses. They do not, as a rule, analyze those lenses. In that
sense, no one pursues purely "objective" learning.
We came to the planning stage of Liberty's law school with the recognition
and acknowledgement that learning often occurs at a deeper level.
Furthermore, we believed that a law school should factor this deeper level of
education into the process of teaching and learning, and develop an approach to
public truth in light of it. Nowhere is this more significant than in the process
7. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 5, at 1229-30 (asserting "that there cannot be any normative
system ultimately based on anything except human will" and tracing some of the scars left on
recent jurisprudential writings by this "growing, and apparently terrifying, realization").
8. The term "surreal" is appropriate because it so significantly departs from the history and
development of the Western legal tradition. See generally HAROLD J.BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
9. The essential moral claims or assumptions of modem law are indefensible without
appeal to historic principles of transcendent objective truth. See infra note 39.
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of theory-making-the development of the cognitive grid through which
humans filter the myriad of data that comes their way."0
It is true that there are practical tasks of a lawyer that require no religious
belief to perform effectively. Such tasks take place at a level of experience
where activities and acquaintance with the world around us are remarkably the
same for all lawyers. For example, it requires no particular religious belief to
conduct a skillful deposition, cross-examine a witness, or draft a technically
sound will or contract.
Nonetheless, there is a deeper level of understanding at which the nature of
law and its implications are interpreted and explained. Teaching and
understanding at this level is attained through theories. 1 It was our contention
that this process of developing theories cannot fail to be influenced by moral or
metaphysical belief of some kind.12 A theory is a hypothesis or guess that is
proposed in order to explain something. Lawyers cannot rationally form
guesses, speculations, or suppositions to explain the definition, source, and
nature of law without reference, undetected or otherwise, to a belief in
something as ultimate. 13 These ultimate beliefs control theory-making in such a
way that the contents of the theories differ depending on the contents of the
ultimate belief they presuppose.
It is at this level of theory-making that Liberty, as a Christian law school,
determined to offer a distinctive contribution to legal education. Serious
consideration into such foundational matters as the source and nature of law,
how a person can truly know anything, what presuppositions drive our theory-
making about these matters and, ultimately, the very nature of authority itself,
are at the core of what it means to study and understand law. Admittedly, such
matters have little to do with the technical proficiency of a lawyer conducting a
deposition or other similar tasks. Nevertheless, law touches society most
deeply at the level of theories about its nature and function, not at the level of
its technical proficiency in legal tasks. Therefore, Liberty University School of
Law determined to formulate a model of legal education that provides a
curricular context in which discussion and deliberation may occur on the great
questions and theories necessary for a deeper understanding of law.
10. See generally Roy A. CLOUSER, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY: AN ESSAY ON
THE HIDDEN ROLE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN THEORIES (rev. ed. 2005) (arguing that theoretical
thinking must ground itself in a metaphysical framework.).
11. Id. at2-3.
12. That is, there will necessarily be a belief in something or other as ultimate, similar to
Left's "extrasystemic premises." See infra note 43.
13. For example, transcendent principles of the natural law or the authority or power of a
sovereign state.
[Vol. 1: 1
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IV. THE FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
In the earliest stages of planning, the University deemed the establishment of
a new law school as the perfect opportunity to address the critical issues and
questions facing law and the legal academy today, as well as provide a context
for achieving a deeper understanding of law. In a climate of moral relativism,
like the climate so prevalent today, the University perceived that a faith-based
law school, particularly a Christian law school, 14 could make a thought-
provoking and distinct contribution to legal education.
Many months of planning ultimately led to a model of legal education rooted
in the history of the Western legal tradition. 5 We determined that Liberty
University's approach to legal education would not be novel or original, but
traditional and rooted in the mainstream of the Western legal tradition. The
goal was not to say something new about law, but to say something worthy and
to say it well. In keeping with this goal, within the first few months after the
decision by the University Board of Trustees to establish the law school, we
determined that the curriculum would be built on certain foundational
principles.
A. The Principle of Universals and the Connection between Law and
Morality
Central to an understanding of law in the Western legal tradition is the
definition and nature of law. The question of the definition and nature of law is
a subset of questions related to the broader question of universals.' 6 Simply
stated, early philosophizing about the nature of law was general. 17 Following
14. This is because the Christian faith and the Christian intellectual tradition are a vital and
historic part of the Western legal tradition. See generally BERMAN, supra note 8. The
University envisioned a return to the historic principles of the Western legal tradition as a
powerful antidote to moral relativism in law.
15. The "Western legal tradition" is a description of a particular legal tradition within the
broader context of Western civilization. The "West" is not to be found with a compass. "West,"
in this context, is a particular historical culture or civilization. There is a "Western" civilization
that developed distinctive legal institutions, values, and concepts. These institutions, values,
and concepts were consciously transmitted from generation to generation over centuries. In this
Western legal tradition, law is conceived to be a coherent whole, an integrated system built upon
antecedent principles, a corpusjuris, a "body," and this body is conceived to be developing in
time, over generations and centuries. See BERMAN, supra note 8, at 5, 7-10 (summarizing the
principal characteristics of the Western legal tradition).
16. The historic philosophical debate surrounding universals focuses on the problem of
whether universals have any status outside the mind, first clearly recognized and addressed by
Plato in the Euthyphro.
17. See, e.g., Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero.
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the thirteenth century, two distinct theories developed-one grounded in the
intellect and one in the will. The former followed and built upon the early
Western thinkers and was based on the primacy of the intellect;' 8 the other
departed from earlier thinkers and was based on the primacy of the will 9 The
former held that there are transcendent and universal principles that exist, while
the latter denied the existence of universals outside the mind. At the risk of
oversimplifying a very complex philosophical debate, proponents of the
existence of universals recognize the existence of natural law and see a
necessary connection between law and morality.20 Those who deny universals
assert that the law is whatever the authority wills, and consequently deny any
necessary connection between law and morality.
21
This philosophically rooted "battle over universals," appearing on the
surface to be entirely a speculative and dry technical question without practical
value, abounds with implications for law and legal education. For example,
18. See ,e.g., Albert the Great, St.Thomas Aquinas, and Robert Bellarmine.
19. See ,e.g., Henry of Ghent, William Ockham, and Gabriel Biel.
20. This group has been historically known as "realists." As represented in its moderate
form by St. Thomas Aquinas, realists believe in the existence of universals and natural law. See
generally ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-Il, QQ. 90-97 (Benziger Bros. 1948)
("Law then pertains to the intellect, and obligation has its source in the necessary relation of
means to the end. The legislator may decide whether a law should be established or not, but it is
not in his power to decide whether or not it will oblige."). See also THOMAS E. DAvIrr, THE
NATURE OF LAW 225 (1953) ("All laws, if they are true laws, oblige in conscience because it is
their nature to do so.").
21. This group has been historically known as "nominalists," from the Latin nominalis, "of
or pertaining to names." Arising from medieval Scholastic philosophy, nominalists denied the
reality of universals. SIMON BLACKBURN, THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 264 (1994).
"Conceptualism" is midway between nominalism and realism. It is "[t]he theory of universals
that sees them as shadows of our grasp of concepts." Id. at 72. Particularly influential
nominalists in the formative Middle Ages debate include William Ockham and Gabriel Biel.
According to Ockham, universals have no objective reality; they are only symbolic terms.
EUGENE G. BEWKES ET AL., THE WESTERN HERITAGE OF FAITH AND REASON 481 (1963).
Moreover, Ockham's rejection of universals allowed him to dispense with any natural law that is
in essence immutable. All that is necessary for a moral act to be right is that it is ordered by the
divine will. "Hence, if God were to order fornication, the latter would not only be licit but
meritorious." 3 FREDERICK COPLESTON, S.J., A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 105 (1953) (citing
WLLM OCKHAM, 3 SENTENCES 12, AAA). "Hatred of God, stealing, committing adultery, are
forbidden by God. But they could be ordered by God; and, if they were, they would be
meritorious acts." Id. at 105 (citing WLLIAM OCKHAM, 2 SENTENCES 19, 0). Although
professing adherence to the Christian faith, Ockham and Biel did not comprehend the profound
detrimental impact their view would later have on moral philosophy in general and, particularly,
on its undermining of any necessary connection between law and morality.
[Vol. 1: 1
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those who deny universals are consequently legal positivists. 22 In legal
positivism, the law is a matter of what has been legislated, ordered, decided, or
practiced.23 Moreover, if this "nominalistic" approach, in whatever form, is
correct, civil law is purely, or merely, penal.24 The will of a human being is not
placed under any necessity by essences or ends. In other words, neither the
essence (nature) of law nor the end (purpose) the law is designed to achieve
places a person under any necessity to obey. All that is needed is will, that is, a
command from a sovereign. Thus, whether the law has a moral end or not is
not necessarily related to whether it should be obeyed.
In contrast to the view of the Western legal tradition, which historically
maintained that truth, justice, human dignity, and other such universals have an
independent, objective existence, nominalists (legal positivists) believe such
categories are created by the mind-mere ideas-and do not originate in
objective realities. 6 It should not be difficult to imagine the shaping impact
each of these conflicting views of law may have on the minds and practices of
young students and lawyers. Under one view, there is never a necessary
connection between law and morality-all that is needed is authority and
power. Under the other, the end (purpose) of every law must be universally
moral and the means to achieve each and every end must also be moral.
22. This is true whether one asserts that the obligation to obey human law originates with
the majority vote of citizens backed by a threat of force or with a divine proclamation from God.
Secular positivism and divine positivism are alike in the sense that all that is necessary for
obligation is a command from a sovereign. There is no necessary connection between law and
morality. A law need not be moral; it only needs to be commanded. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 234 (1990) ("[B]ut positive law, on the positivist
view, has no necessary foundation in morals and is not in a realistic sense consented to by those
who are subject to it.").
23. Lon Fuller calls legal positivism "that direction of legal thought which insists on
drawing a sharp distinction between the law that is and the law that ought to be." LON L.
FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 5 (1966). In essence, positivism is the jurisprudential
theory that law is what is "posited." A legal system is a fact. It is something that exists. The
way to identify its existence is to discover in fact what rules are enacted or obeyed. In this
system, the term "law" describes not good behavior or right behavior, but behavior. The central
problem with this system is that it equally validates every legal system.
24. It need not conform to any transcendent principles of right or wrong, justice or injustice,
because none exist.
25. As Gabriel Biel held, the fact that killing others, stealing, and other such acts are of
their objective essence opposed to the form and essence of man, and therefore necessarily
against the attainment of his end, does not necessarily make them bad actions. Rather, they are
bad merely because they are forbidden by the command of the divine will. DAVrr, supra note
20, at 63 (discussing Biel's view).
26. See BERMAN, supra note 8, at 176.
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In today's law schools, legal positivism (in all its varied forms), while
demonstrably a departure from the historic Western legal tradition, is the
dominant view. The belief in universals (known commonly as the natural law
tradition), while rooted in the historic Western legal tradition, is highly
underrepresented in the legal academy. Ironically, however, all law schools,
legal institutions, and lawyers are forced to act as if concepts such as truth,
justice, human dignity, and other such things are universals. Otherwise, there
would be nothing to teach or practice. For example, if a law school did not act
as if justice really exists as an objective and universal concept, rather than
merely as a subjective thought in each individual mind, of what would the law
be in pursuit? Indeed, why would law schools exist at all?
Admittedly, these are complex issues and much work remains to be done.
Nevertheless, Liberty University, as a distinctively Christian institution,
maintains that universals exist and are knowable. 27 The differences between
disorder and order, between right and wrong, between justice and injustice are
not determined merely by the command of a sovereign, otherwise there would
be no necessary connection between command and morality. Rather, a
sovereign is under an obligation to command that which is universally right and
just by its nature, and humans are thus obligated to obey as a matter of
conscience. Obligation to obey has its foundation in the objective relation of
the means ordered to the common good. A command or law obliges because
what it commands is objectively and universally for the common good.28
Although foundational to the Western legal tradition, this view is now
underrepresented in law and legal institutions. The absence of its presence in
every discussion about the nature of law in the legal academy today is a
profound loss to American society, as well as a virtual deconstruction of the
history of law and the Western legal tradition. In significant part, the birth of
faith-based law schools, particularly Christian law schools, is a vital attempt to
re-introduce into discussions about law and legal education the history of the
Western legal tradition and natural law thought.
At the outset, Liberty University determined to foster an enlightened
commitment to the historic understanding of the nature of law and the natural
27. In the form of the natural law tradition, this was a common view throughout the history
of the Western legal tradition. See, e.g., BERmAN, supra note 8, at 12 ("In the formative era of
the Western legal tradition, natural-law theory predominated.... Thus natural-law theory is
written into the positive law of the United States."). See also HEnRICH A. RoMMEN,
INTRODUCTION TO THE NATURAL LAW xv (1998) ("It is a historical fact that the ideas of natural
law and natural rights shaped the Founding of the United States and in the 1860s its
refounding.").
28. ST.THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, Q. 90, art. 2.
[Vol. 1: 1
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law tradition.29 In furtherance of this commitment, the law school firmly
embraced the natural law tradition as the answer to the age-old problem of
universals and the only theory of law that affirms a necessary connection
between law and morality.30
B. The Integral Role of Religion and the Christian Intellectual Tradition
The second foundational principle of the Liberty law school model is the
integral role of religion and, specifically, the Christian intellectual tradition in
the development of the Western legal tradition. Almost forgotten today in legal
education is the formative role religion, particularly the Christian faith and the
Christian intellectual tradition, played in the development of the Western legal
tradition. A convincing case can be, and has been, made that "[i]t is impossible
to understand the revolutionary quality of the Western legal tradition without
exploring its religious dimension.",31 Yet, it is rare in American law schools to
hear "that basic institutions, concepts, and values of Western legal systems have
their sources in religious rituals, liturgies, and doctrines of the eleventh and
twelfth centuries ....
The American common law system has its roots in ecclesiastical law and is
firmly grounded in the thought of St. Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas
Aquinas. A need exists today in American legal education for faith-based law
schools not only to address the conventional presuppositions underlying
modern law, but also to re-introduce the next generation of legal thinkers to the
historic roots and justification of law in the Western legal tradition. Otherwise,
frustrated law school students may graduate from three years of legal education
only to conclude that "many parts of the law appear to lack any underlying
source of validity."
33
Concerned with the trends in modern law and the loss of historic roots and
first principles in much of legal education, Liberty sought to make a
29. There are differing theories of natural law and reasonable minds differ on its many
applications. By "historic understanding," we mean the contribution to legal philosophy and the
Western legal tradition first made by St. Augustine and adopted and built upon by medieval
scholars, particularly by St. Thomas Aquinas. It was St. Thomas who developed the first
systematic treatment of legal philosophy. See Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Fundamental Ideas
in St. Augustine's Philosophy of Law, 18 AM. J. JuRis. 57, 57-79 (1973).
30. Historically, there are two major theories of law: positivism and the natural law
tradition. While there are varied forms of positivism, all the variations share the tenet that no
necessary connection between law and morality exists. The natural law tradition recognizes that
law and morality are distinct, but a necessary connection exists between the two.
31. BERMAN, supra note 8, at 165.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 166.
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contribution to law and legal education by self-consciously determining to bring
about a return to an emphasis on the sources of the Western legal tradition.34
Our inspiration was the Christian intellectual tradition and its indispensable
contribution to the development of the corpusjuris of that tradition.35
The Christian intellectual tradition is not an external imposition of an
orthodoxy of belief, religious or otherwise.36 It is not religious worship or
particular theological teaching. It is, however, more than a history of
scholarship engaged in by people of Christian faith. It involves a search for
truth, embracing the relationship between faith and reason. Specifically, it is a
reflection on human knowledge about any discipline in light of Christian faith,
in fidelity to the authority of the Holy Scriptures, and a commitment to serving
humanity. It involves a profound appreciation for honest investigation,
reflection, and intellectual inquiry.
37
A law school that approaches its educational task from the perspective of the
Christian intellectual tradition is a community of scholars and students united
by a love for truth and a desire to integrate faith and reason in the search for the
truth about law. It is not merely a collection of individuals interested in a
professional vocation, but a community grounded in a particular view of the
world as expressed through the lens of the varied and historic Christian
intellectual tradition. All educational communities ground their dominant
viewpoints in something. If not Christian faith, such communities commonly
34. Hence the law school adopted adfontes ("back to the sources") as its educational
philosophy.
35. See generally BERMAN, supra note 8. See also, CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, THE CRISIS OF
WESTERN EDUCATION 3-25 (1989) (providing an overview of the impact of Christianity on
Western education and universities).
36. Although a Christian law school is animated and guided by Christian faith, it is
welcoming of those who do not share that perspective, but nonetheless respect the mission and
express an interest in the program of legal education. This is due in large measure to the
Christian emphasis on respect for and service to all mankind. From an academic perspective, a
Christian law school requires a critical mass of committed scholars dedicated to the search for
truth from a Christian point of view. It should be a place of dynamic, rigorous, and open
discussion, and the discussion ought to be guided by the historic rules for demanding
intellectual investigation. Neither scholars nor students should ever be insulated from differing
viewpoints, nor from the requirement that their own views survive the most exacting scrutiny
and analysis.
37. As one Christian thinker and educator has observed, "all branches of knowledge are
connected together, because the subject-matter of knowledge is intimately united in itself, as
being the acts and the work of the Creator." JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIvERSITY
76 (Frank M. Turner ed., 1947).
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turn to the surrounding culture and end up absolutizing a particular social or
political concept.
38
We believed, and still do, that the diversity of the legal academy is greatly
benefited by the existence of dynamic faith-based law schools. The value of
the contribution to be made to the larger legal community by faith-based law
schools depends not upon the fragility and feebleness of their views, but upon
their institutional vibrancy. Without belief in the soundness of Christian truth
claims, for instance, a Christian law school will fail to ensure integration of
faith and reason. In its dialogue with wider culture, such a law school will be a
weak contributor to the larger academy, having little of its own to offer, and
still less that it believes to be critical to making a better legal system.
It is a formative belief shared by Liberty University that a Christian law
school exists to engage the wider culture but always in accord with the truth of
the Christian faith. A Christian law school should never be constricted, narrow-
minded, or in any way closed in on itself; rather, it must participate in a
dialogue with the wider culture and legal community. In particular, it
contributes to that dialogue by explaining the profound role of the Christian
intellectual tradition in the development of Western legal institutions and the
Western legal tradition. It contributes by revealing how modem law and legal
institutions need the faith and morals of Christianity to sustain their deepest
assumptions about the experience of responsible freedom, human dignity, and
social justice.39 It contributes by offering and advancing the only reasonable
and reliable answer to the question of why mankind is obligated to obey human
laws-the natural law.40
38. Law schools, in rejecting the Christian faith, often ground their dominant viewpoints in
the pursuit ofjustice grounded in naturalistic or materialistic premises or the pursuit ofjustice
grounded in political means.
39. If one looks closely at the distinctive features of modem law and legal institutions, one
finds a notion of justice whose fundamental assumptions are concepts like personal
responsibility, freedom, human dignity, and the sanctity of human life. It is doubtful, however,
that modem law is able to vindicate those fundamental assumptions either at a theoretical level
or in argument. The assumptions upon which the Western legal tradition grew and prospered
are necessary for that vindication-and they are distinctly Christian assumptions. For example,
man has human dignity because he is created in the image of God. Man thus possesses personal
freedom, as to other humans, and should exercise such freedom responsibly, because to do
anything less is to act in a manner inconsistent with true humanity (as one created in God's
image). On the other hand, utilitarianism, instrumentalism, pragmatism, and power are all
fueled by moral relativism. Thus, they may be assumed adequate bases for responsible personal
freedom, human dignity, and sanctity of human life, but they cannot be vindicated as such
through rational argument.
40. At the risk of oversimplification, the two answers to the question of obligation are: (1)
man is obligated by the exercise of external and superior force (obligation depends upon the will
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C. The Relationship between Faith and Reason
The third foundational principle upon which Liberty's law school model was
based is the connection between faith and reason. We believe that a
commitment to academic and professional excellence is greatly enhanced by the
recognition that Christian faith and reason are necessarily connected. In simple
terms, this means that the data of reality-facts about the world and all that
happens within it, including history and law-are realities to be observed,
analyzed, and evaluated by the faculty of reason, but from the perspective of
Christian faith. 41 Faith and reason, far from contradicting each other, aid each
other. Reason, being prone to error, is illuminated by the light of faith. Faith
does not in any way suppress the free faculty of reason nor reduce its scope of
action. Faith does, however, clarify the understanding that in all the events of
human history and in every discipline, it is God who is at work. 42 And thus,
neither the events of human history nor the discipline of law can be properly
understood without reference to the God who transcends human history.
All efforts to know must begin with something given, including educational
efforts.43 We decided early on that Liberty University School of Law would be
forthright about its "givens," which are the historic foundational principles that
animated the Western legal tradition, including the vital connection between
faith and reason.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE OF LIBERTY'S
APPROACH TO LEGAL EDUCATION
The need for a distinctive approach to legal education, the intended
contribution of Liberty's model, and the foundational principles upon which the
law school is based all presuppose a more fundamental premise undergirding
the founding of Liberty University School of Law. That premise is that
of the lawgiver); or (2) man is obligated by the objective nature of acts and their relation to the
end (obligation depends upon an objectively proper end accompanied by objectively proper
means). The first answer is positivism, in whatever variation it appears; the second answer is a
natural law approach.
41. John Paul II, Fides Et Ratio, 100-08 (1998),
http://www.vatican.va/edos/ENG0216/___PI.HTM (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (encyclical letter
to the Bishops of the Catholic Church).
42. Id. at IM 36-48.
43. Everyone and every system has a "given," or an "ultimate starting point." At root, legal
philosophies and legal systems are based on some sort of extra-systemic premises. See BERMAN,
supra note 8, at 16 ("Moreover, law-in all societies-derives its authority from something
outside itself . . ."). See generally Leff, supra note 5.
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instruction in the narrow, technical aspects of law practice is not, by itself, the
solitary end for legal education.
In founding the law school, we began with the premise that education,
irrespective of the specific discipline, is a conditional good: knowledge or
education is not an end in itself but must serve the end of truth about God and
the dignity of man. 44 If education does not serve the truth about God and man,
then it tends toward relativism and amorality or immorality. Thus, in
approaching the task of legal education, we embraced the idea that an
institution that seeks to make a meaningful contribution to the legal profession
must have a qualified view of education: education has an end beyond itself
prescribed by natural and divine law.45 In order for tomorrow's lawyers to
effectively serve the common good of society, instruction in the proper ends
and means of legal education and law is necessary.
Institutions of higher learning, too numerous to cite, have been founded upon
this qualified view of education.46 From the perspective of Liberty University,
legal education is a means and not an ultimate end; its moral value is not
automatic, but depends upon conformity to higher law and the morality of the
end it pursues.
Christian educational institutions have historically sought to integrate faith,
learning, and service prescribed by natural and divine law, for ends beyond
44. Pope John Paul II articulates this concept in Veritatis Splendor ("The Splendor of
Truth"), in which he addresses the moral life. See John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, 31-34(1993), http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/johnjpalii/encyclicals/documents/hfjp-
ii enc 06081993_veritatis-splendoren.html#top (last visited Nov. 30,2006) (encyclical letter
to the Bishops of the Catholic Church). He describes freedom as a conditional good and holds
that it must serve the truth about God and the truth about man. John Paul II's analysis was
helpful to me in clarifying that nothing could be more fundamental in the task of developing a
program of legal education than serving the truth about God and the truth about man in relation
to law and legal education. John Paul II previously alluded to this kind of application when he
stated in his 1990 Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities, Ex Corde Ecclesiae ("Out of
the Heart of the Church"), that a Catholic ("Christian") university is distinguished from its
secular counterpart by its "free search for the whole truth about nature, man, and God." See
John Paul II, Apostolic Constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 4 (1990),
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/johnpaul-ii/apostconstitutions/documents/hfjp-
iiapc_15081990_ex-corde-ecclesiaeen.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). This principle
applies equally to Catholic and Protestant educational institutions.
45. See John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, 80-83 (1993),
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/john_paulii/encyclicals/documents/hfjp-
ii enc 06081993_veritatis-splendoren.html (last visited on Nov. 30, 2006) (encyclical letter to
the Bishops of the Catholic Church).
46. Among these are the Jesuit universities, Baylor University, Catholic University of
America, Brigham Young University, Ave Maria School of Law, and Regent University School
of Law.
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knowledge itself. Historically Protestant institutions have long been founded
upon such a viewpoint and approach.47 These institutions, as well as
historically Catholic schools, recognized that the human quest for knowledge is
an exercise in something beyond the accumulation of information in a particular
field of study--even a quest for knowledge that transcends human life and
experience.
Many of the students in the inaugural class of Liberty University School of
Law testified to the fact that they came to the law school not simply because
they wanted to be corporate lawyers, politicians, or constitutional litigators, but
because the particular mission of the law school resonated with them in such a
way that it exposed a longing or yearning in their hearts for knowledge-
specifically, the truth about law and its relationship to transcendent principles.
Some witnessed to a longing or desire for a community of like-minded people
in search of what is right and good and true-and the source from which those
things derive.4 8
However, in keeping with the conditional nature of legal education that
serves God and the dignity of man, a Christian law school will address this
sense of longing by telling its students that these deep longings can never be
fulfilled in the context of legal education. Humans simply cannot find their
ultimate fulfillment in a torts class, because human beings want more
fulfillment than what the knowledge about law offers. Much can satisfy the
human heart for a time, but nothing, including a legal education, will truly
quench human thirst for knowledge or fulfill human longing.49
Consistent with its mission, Liberty University maintains that one of the
tasks of a Christian law school is to tell its students the truth about their
longings. The sense of yearning and longing to understand, to know, to
express, is rooted in what it means to be a human created in the image of God.
It must be straightforwardly stated that those longings will not be satisfied at
law school, whether at Liberty University or elsewhere. That is because legal
education--even Christian legal education-is a conditional good; it has an end
beyond itself, part of which is to serve the truth about God as the ultimate
fulfillment of our longings---even the yearning for knowledge aboutjustice and
the truth about law.
47. Universities such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton.
48. CORNELIUS PLANTINGA, JR., ENGAGING GOD'S WORLD: A CHRIsTIAN VISION OF FAITH,
LEARNING, AND LIVING 1-16 (2002) (explaining the idea of "longing" as it relates to the quest
for knowledge, which is rooted ultimately in the desire to know God).
49. As St. Augustine acknowledged, "because you made us for yourself and our hearts find
no peace until they rest in you." ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 21 (R.S. Pine-Coffin trans.,
Penguin Books 1961).
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It is sometimes easy to forget that law schools are ultimately aimed at the
instruction of human students. While the teaching of law is designed to
enlighten students in one particular discipline or field of study, it must do so by
teaching the whole person. The dignity of the human person in the context of
education is a paramount consideration. This is particularly true of the field of
law, where the use of responsible freedom must be guided by a sense of internal
duty and conscience if government and society are to function without constant
external pressure and coercion.
It takes little observation to conclude that the average law student, these
days, often appears jaded, lackluster, bored, and world-weary. As Robert
Granfield points out, a pattern of cynical disengagement from a student's ideals
occurs with frequency in law schools these days. 0 Indeed, students internalize
this cynicism at very early stages within their training and adopt it as their
central intellectual orientation.5' Roger C. Cramton, former Dean of Cornell
Law School, even more forcefully states that modem dogmas that entangle
legal education today include "a moral relativism tending toward nihilism," "a
pragmatism tending toward an amoral instrumentalism," and "a realism tending
toward cynicism.',5 2 A growing body of professional literature indicates that
separating faith from morals, law from morality, and substituting cynicism for
idealism promotes lethargy, desensitizes, creates apathy, and ultimately
dehumanizes.5 3 In short, it makes a desert of the soul.
Legal education that fortifies the mind and heart against faith, morals, and
idealism will not affirm the dignity of man. The belief that legal education is a
conditional good-that it must serve the truth about God and the truth about
man-motivated Liberty University to seek to construct a program of legal
education that does not undermine student idealism by making a desert of the
soul. Instead, its founders sought to irrigate, nurture, and mold idealism into a
realism that understands the historic discipline of law and emphasizes academic
and professional excellence, while affirming the truth about God and the
dignity of man.
50. GRANFimLD, supra note 5, at 61-64.
51. Id.
52. Cramton, supra note 5, at 262-63. In his classic article, Cramton pointedly describes
the culture of legal education in America and its negative consequences for students.
53. See, e.g., id.
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